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ABSTRACT

Municipal bonds corresponding to states that passed effective post-Kelo
restrictions on eminent domain takings experienced an increase in yields. The high costs
associated with property acquisitions in states with strong legislation deter economic
development takings and contribute to the decreasing of municipal bond prices. The
financial effect attributed to municipal bonds issued for the purpose of economic
improvement completely exceeds the impact offered by industrial improvement and
public improvement bonds. The Kelo decision itself reinforced the appropriateness of
government takings for private gain. The outcome directly affected municipal bond
yields, causing an increase in price because of the low cost involved with property
seizures. A sample of 4403 municipal bonds, two legislation classification systems, and
bond exposure in 42 of the 50 states ensures robustness in the analysis. The importance
of an efficient amount of government intervention is critical to the health of society.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

According to the Fifth Amendment, an individual may not “be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.” The purpose of the takings clause in the Fifth
Amendment is to restrict how far and by what means a government entity can exercise its
right to seize private property for public use. The public right to seize property is known
as eminent domain. Eminent domain is formally defined as the power of the state to seize
a citizen's private property, expropriate property, or rights in property for public use,
without the owner's consent1. The evolution of the interpretation of “public use” has
changed over time and represented the most contentious disagreements over its use. The
once narrow definition of “public use”, included takings that directly benefit the
community such as highways, municipal buildings, and airports, has been transformed
into an extensive understanding of the term which encompasses any takings that will
increase social welfare. This transition is mirrored in the outcome of the controversial
Supreme Court case, Kelo v. City of New London2.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION:
During the late 1990’s, the city of New London, Connecticut experienced slow
economic growth and generated revenue less than the amount needed to cover costs. In
order to stimulate the deteriorating economy and promote growth, the city initiated a

1
2

USLaw.com, http://www.uslaw.com/us_law_dictionary/e/Eminent+Domain
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
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revival plan under the guidance of the New London Development Corporation (NLDC).
The NLDC served as a private, non-profit intermediary between the city’s interest and the
public view. The NLDC was in charge of holding public hearings, acquiring property,
and redistributing the seized private property to the most valued users. Part of the revival
initiative included enticing Pfizer Corporation to locate its new research institution on the
Thames River. To make the area more attractive and induce Pfizer Corporation to invest
capital in New London, the NLDC proposed redeveloping an adjacent tract of land. The
projected area, Fort Trumbull would serve as a better complement to the neighboring
research facility if it were redeveloped.
After Pfizer’s investment commitment, the NLDC fulfilled its promise by
disclosing the redevelopment plan to the public. The plan consisted of transforming the
predominately middle to low income Fort Trumbull area, into a more modern facade
including a luxury hotel, conference center, upscale residential and commercial
properties, and a state park. The NLDC negotiated fair market acquisitions of all the
properties except 15 residential tracts owned by 9 individuals. The NLDC was given the
license to obtain the reluctant property owner’s land by means of the city’s eminent
domain authority.
The lead plaintiff in the Kelo v. City of New London case, Susette Kelo, believed
the seizure of her and her neighbor’s properties violated the Takings Clause in the Fifth
Amendment. According to Kelo, the city’s actions unjustly expanded the intended
meaning of “public use”. The stubborn property owners argued their case against the city
of New London at the state level in the Supreme Court of Connecticut. Kelo and the
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other plaintiffs contended that the city circumvented the law to transfer property from
private owners in Fort Trumbull to a private entity (NLDC), which was inconsistent with
the original intent of the Takings Clause. The Supreme Court of Connecticut favored
New London by offering the statement, “an economic development plan that the
appropriate legislative authority rationally has determined will promote significant
municipal economic development constitutes a valid public use for the exercise of the
eminent domain power.”3
After pressure from the Institute for Justice on behalf of Kelo, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the extent of limitations of the Fifth
Amendment pertaining to private takings by municipalities for economic development.
The Kelo petition, presented by the Institute for Justice, offers 3 supporting arguments,
(I) The condemnation of petitioners’ homes for the sole purpose of economic
development violates the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment, (II) Even if
this court holds that eminent domain for economic development is not categorically
unconstitutional, these particular condemnations still do not constitute a public use, (III)
The sky will not fall if this court rules in favor of petitioners, while a ruling affirming the
Connecticut Supreme Court will open the flood gates4. Advocates of private property
protection hoped the high court’s decision to hear the case would place some meaningful
restrictions on eminent domain takings. The Kelo case was the first major eminent
domain trial to be heard at the Supreme Court level since the Hawaii Housing Authority

3
4

Kelo v. New London, 843 A. 2d 500, 528 (Conn. 2004).
Brief of Petitioners, On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, No. 04-108
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v. Midkiff5 case in 1984, which had greatly expanded the eminent domain authority and
the definition of public use to include public benefit.
The Kelo case was argued on February 22, 2005 in front of only 7 of the 9
Supreme Court justices. 4 months later, the U.S. Supreme Court offered a 5-4 decision
supporting the actions of New London. The majority opinion was endorsed by Justice
John P. Stevens, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen
Breyer. The majority opinion was based on prior precedent established by cases such as
Berman v. Parker6 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.
The Berman case entailed a redevelopment plan targeting a blighted portion of
Washington, D.C. Within the projected area, a local department store owner disputed the
condemnation, stating that his store was not described as blighted. The U.S. Supreme
Court refused to assess the specific claim of the plaintiff, deferring the decision to a more
extensive ruling on the redevelopment plan in the entirety. The broad interpretation of
the “public use” term in the Takings Clause was explicitly accepted by an undivided
court:
“We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not
desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive… The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies
have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not
for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide
5
6

Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)
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that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing
in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way”7
The outcome of the infamous Berman case restructured the definition of the “public use”
clause to include “public purpose”. The expanded meaning of “public use” derived from
the Berman case served as a legal landmark for future cases pertaining to eminent domain
such as Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff and Kelo v. City of New London.
In 1984, the Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff case was brought before the
U.S. Supreme Court. In light of highly concentrated ownership on the island of Oahu,
the Hawaii Housing Authority used eminent domain to redistribute land ownership. The
reallocation would prevent oligopoly land ownership, maintain land prices, and promote
public welfare. For public policy reasons, the Hawaii Housing Authority forced the sale
of leased lands to ensure a more equitable division of property. The principle land
owners were forced to relinquish their property to long-term lessees at fair market value.
The plaintiff, Midkiff, argued that the entire burden of the Land Reform Act (1967) was
incurred by the rightful property owners. In a unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court
supported the Hawaii Housing Authority. The decision was based on the state’s
inalienable right to utilize policing power to ensure markets operate efficiently. The
justices declared the land did not have to be put to a “public use” in order to qualify for
eminent domain use. The determination implies judicial deference to the Hawaii
Housing Authority or any acting legislature. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concluded:
“In our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public
purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the taking power… Thus, if a
7

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) Id., at 33
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legislature, state or federal, determines there are substantial reasons for an
exercise of the taking power, courts must defer to its determination that the taking
will serve a public use.”8
The ruling in favor of the Hawaii Housing Authority reaffirmed the Berman decision.
Based on the strength of the established precedent, Kelo’s negative outcome for
the private property owners was anticipated. The majority opinion, written by Justice
Stevens emphasized the importance of the long standing precedent, which served as the
main contributor to the final decision. Although the concurring judges were adamant
about their decision, they acknowledged the suffering induced by eminent domain
takings. Justice Stevens also embraced the idea of individual states enacting legislation
to further protect citizens from eminent domain exploitation: “We emphasize that nothing
in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the
taking power.”9
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice O’Connor demonstrated
disbelief of the majority opinion’s conclusion. She presented evidence on the failure of
the Supreme Court in determining explicit limitations on how far municipal takings can
extend. This failure to establish limits makes all private property subject to “being taken
and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded.”10 She also
states, “Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now
vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be

8

Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) Id. at 244.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) Id.
10
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) Id. At 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
9

6

upgraded-i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more
beneficial to the public-in the process.”11
O’Connor explained the differences between the Kelo case and Berman and
Midkiff cases. The Berman and Midkiff takings were consistent with the “Public Use
Clause” because “the extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property
inflicted affirmative harm on society-in Berman through blight resulting from extreme
poverty and in Midkiff through oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth.”12 In both
cases, the takings were deemed constitutional because the legislative entity mitigated
harm by removing or redistributing property use.13 The takings performed by the
legislative body in Berman and Midkiff were considered a direct public benefit even
though the transfer was private-to-private.
On the other hand, the property acquired through means of eminent domain in
New London was not blighted. The homes of Susette Kelo and Wilhelmina Dery were
well-maintained and generated no social harm.14 O’Connor states, after Kelo nothing “is
to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a
shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”15 The premise of the dissenting opinion
explains how the majority decision moves way from “harmful property use”
condemnation conclusions in Berman and Midkiff to a more extensive meaning of public
use. O’Connor’s opinion states, “It holds that the sovereign may take private property
currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so
11

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) Id. At 494
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) Id. At 2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
13
Berman, supra, at 28-29, 75 S. Ct. 98; Midkiff, supra, at 232, 104 S. Ct. 2321
14
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) Id. At 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
15
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) Id. At 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
12
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long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public-such as
increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even esthetic pleasure.”16 According to this
statement, the “public use” clause can be applied to any circumstance where benefit is
received by transfer of property, rendering it useless. Eminent domain is not constrained
by the new precedent established by the Kelo decision.
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO KELO:
In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens encouraged states to provide further
legislative limitations on takings allowed by municipalities. The political conflict
induced by the Kelo decision and the call by Stevens to legislate has 43 states enacting
some type of post-Kelo legislative reform.17 Table 1.1 provides the dates that states
adopted eminent domain reforms after Kelo. (As of February 16, 2009)
Table 1.1: State Legislative Action Post-Kelo:
States:
Legislation Type:
Signed Law Date:
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
California

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
16

SB 68
HB 654
HB 318
Proposition 207
SB 53
SB 1206
SB 1210
SB 1650
SB 1809
HB 1411
SB 167
SB 217
HB 1567
HJR 1569
HB 1306

08/03/2005
04/25/2006
07/05/2006
11/07/2006
09/29/2006
09/29/2006
09/29/2006
09/29/2006
09/29/2006
06/06/2006
06/25/2007
07/21/2005
05/11/2006
05/04/2006
04/04/2006

Voter Approved:

11/07/2006

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) Id. At 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

17

http://www.castlecoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=510 (visited Feb. 16,
2009)
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Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Mexico
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee

Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia

Washington

HB 1313
HB 555
SB 3086
HB 1010
HF 2351
SB 323
HB 508
HB 707
SB 1
LB 1870
SB 3
SJR E
SF 2750
HB 1944
SB 41
SB 363
LB 924
AB 102
SB 287
CACR 30
HB 393
SB 401
HB 1965
Measure 2
SB 2214
SB 167
SB 7
Measure 39
HB 2054
SB 881
S2728A
SB 1031
HB 1080
HB 3450
SB 3296
HB 3700
SB 7
SB 117
HB 365
S 246
HB 2954
SB 781
SB 1296
HB 1458

04/04/2006
03/21/2006
07/28/2006
03/24/2006
07/14/2351
05/18/2006
03/28/2006
06/19/2006
05/31/2006
04/13/2006
05/08/2007
12/13/2005
05/19/2006
07/13/2006
05/08/2007
05/16/2007
04/13/2006
05/23/2007
06/23/2006
04/20/2006
04/03/2007
04/03/2007
08/10/2006
11/07/2006
04/05/2007
11/16/2005
07/10/2007
11/07/2006
05/04/2006
05/04/2006
07/02/2008
06/14/2006
03/17/2006
06/05/2006
06/05/2006
06/27/2006
09/01/2005
03/21/2006
03/20/2006
04/14/2006
04/04/2007
04/04/2007
04/04/2007
04/04/2007
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11/07/2006

09/30/2006
09/30/2006

11/07/2006

11/07/2006

11/07/2006

West Virginia
HB 4048
04/05/2006
Wisconsin
AB 657
03/30/2006
Wyoming
HB 124
02/28/2007
Source: Castle Coalition: Enacted Legislation since Kelo:
http://www.castlecoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=510

Some states have followed through with the Justice Stevens’ request to supplement state
law by means of narrowing the definition of blight to encompass areas that only threaten
public health and safety or abolishing eminent domain use for blight. Other states
enacted insignificant post-Kelo reform for reasons such as negotiations, haste, or political
pressure from lobbyists, lawyers, developers, and real estate agents. The residual states
not falling into any of the two previous categories, elected to falter and not pass any form
of legislature. In the time after Kelo, state eminent domain reform has been intensely
evaluated by lawyers, economists, and other scholars. To capture alternative
interpretations of these laws in the analysis, two classification methods are employed.
The classification systems will be explained in more detail in Chapter 2.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUNI YIELDS AND EMINENT DOMAIN
Municipal bonds are issued by states or municipalities to generate revenue for
numerous public projects. Bond traders who price municipal bonds are interested in two
determinants, future tax expectations and non-revenue factors. Future tax expectations of
municipalities play an essential role in the determination of municipal bond prices. Tax
capacity is determined by multiplying the market value of each property within the city
by the tax rate for the use of the property. The tax rate is the fee required from each
property to collect the amount of dollars needed to operate public systems. If a
municipality has a large tax capacity, they will be able to meet their debt obligations.

10

The smaller the city’s tax capacity, the higher the default premium and the less likely to
meet financial needs. Future tax expectations will not be explored in this study.
The other determinant of municipal bond prices and yields is non-revenue factors
such as state legislation and other market conditions. A public policy such effective
restrictions on eminent domain takings by municipalities contribute to the pricing of the
municipal bond. This analysis will look at the pricing of municipal bonds in relationship
to the consequences induced by Kelo and the state legislation passed thereafter. If a state
passed effective post-Kelo reform, yields are predicted to rise because the cost incurred in
the takings will rise significantly. If a state passes ineffective restrictions on eminent
domain takings, the yields on municipal bonds within the state will decrease or not be
affected.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE:
The fundamental objective of this analysis is to better understand legislative
eminent domain reforms induced by Kelo. It also attempts to decipher the many and
complex motives pushing states to pass different degrees of meaningful reform. An
extensive background investigation of the evolution of private property rights throughout
the years in the United States will provide a sound foundation for a concentrated study on
economic development takings.
Previous literature pertaining to the post-Kelo reaction is examined and utilized
to supplement the study. Municipal bonds issued for the purpose of economic
improvement, public improvement, and industrial improvement will be analyzed to
determine the relationship between current bid yields and the effectiveness of post-Kelo

11

reform at the state level. Examples of each type of municipal bond purpose will be
provided.
The municipal bond yields for states that passed effective post-Kelo reform are
expected to rise between the measurement dates because of the high cost involved in the
acquisition of private property. The increased protection of property rights will drive the
price of the bond down and inversely cause the yield to go up. The municipal bond
yields for states that passed ineffective post-Kelo reform are projected to fall because the
difficulty to seize property is very low. The minimal cost to acquire land under
ineffective reform inflates the price of the bond causing the yield to decrease. The yield
analysis will add value to the importance of effective eminent domain legislation and
provide further insight on the consequences provoked by Kelo.

12

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

CLASSIFICATION METHODS:
The Castle Coalition, a national grassroots property rights activism project
initiated by the Institute for Justice, developed a classification system to evaluate the
effectiveness of post-Kelo legislation on a state-by-state basis. The “50 State Report
Card”18 published in June 2007, assigns each state a letter grade based on the quality of
their reform. Each state’s legislation is appraised on the pivotal question, “How hard is it
now for the government to take a person’s home or business and give it to someone else
for private gain?”19 States that made it more difficult to condemn property receive A’s
and B’s on the ordinal scale. States responding with relatively simple conditions receive
a grade of C or D. States receiving F’s failed to pass any post-Kelo reform.
5 states were classified as passing grade “A-“and above forms of legislation
(Florida, Michigan, New Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota). 16 states passed
post-Kelo reform worthy of receiving a grade of “B-“to “B+” (Alabama, Arizona,
Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming). 6 states passed
law reforms classified as “C” range material (Colorado, North Carolina, Texas,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). 15 states received a “D” rating for enacting
law with limited strength (Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois,

18
19

Castle Coalition, www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf
Castle Coalition, www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf, pg. 4
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Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Tennessee, and
Vermont). The remaining 8 states were assigned “F” grades for not enacting any type of
post-Kelo reform (Arkansas, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New
York, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island). There is no regional pattern present when
allocating the state’s grades. The time elapsed from Kelo until each state’s legislation
has no relevant effect on the classification.
Ilya Somin’s paper, “The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response
to Kelo,” develops a classification system categorizing three types of legislature.
Somin’s method is the most current source to date (January 2008), including any new
state amendments after the Castle Coalition’s “50 State Report Card” in June 2007.
State legislative reform is deemed “Effective” if it “provides property owners with at
least some significant protection against economic development condemnations beyond
that available under preexisting law.”20 Also included within the limits of “effective”
reform are laws that mitigate the probability of economic development takings even
though they may not completely prohibit takings. Post-Kelo reform is considered
“ineffective” if “they forbid economic development condemnations but essentially allow
them to continue under another name, as in the case of states with broad definitions of
“blight” that allow virtually any property to be declared blighted and condemned.”21 The
last category, “no reform” includes all states that failed to alter their existing eminent
domain law.

20
21

Ilya Somin, “The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo”, pg. 11
Ilya Somin, “The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo”, pg. 12
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According to Somin, 19 states are classified as passing effective legislation
(Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming). The remaining 30 states
excluding Utah (Passed legislation before Kelo) passed ineffective legislation (Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). The state of
Utah passed effective legislation before the Kelo decision was offered. Utah will be
included as a “1” in the analysis. The regional spatial distribution of states based on
strength of legislation is relatively equal. No one specific region has a dominant share of
states passing effective or ineffective post-Kelo legislation.
For the purposes of this paper, grades A+ to B- assigned by the Castle Coalition
are coded as “1”, and grades C+ to F- are coded as “0”. Somin’s classification as
“effective” will be assigned “1”. Somin’s classification as “ineffective” or “no reform”
will be coded “0”. Table 2.1 illustrates the Castle Coalition’s sorting method and Ilya
Somin’s classification system.
Table 2.1: State Classification Methods22
State:
Castle Coalition
CC Variable
Classification:
Coding:
B+
1
Alabama
D
0
Alaska
22

Somin’s
Classification:
Effective
Ineffective

S Variable
Coding:
1
0

Ilya Somin, “The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo”, pg. 14-15; Castle
Coalition, www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf , synopsis
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Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

B+
F
DC
D
DA
B+
F
D+
D+
B
BB+
D+
B
D+
D
F
ABF
D
D
D+
B+
B+
F
AF
CA
D
F
B+
BF
B+
A
DC-

1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0

Effective
No Reform
Ineffective
Ineffective
Ineffective
Ineffective
Effective
Effective
No Reform
Effective
Ineffective
Effective
Ineffective
Effective
Ineffective
Effective
Ineffective
Ineffective
No Reform
Effective
Effective
No Reform
Ineffective
Ineffective
Ineffective
Effective
Effective
No Reform
Effective
No Reform
Ineffective
Effective
Ineffective
No Reform
Effective
Effective
Ineffective
Ineffective
Effective
Ineffective
Ineffective
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1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0

Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

B
DB+
CCC+
B

1
0
1
0
0
0
1

Enacted Prior Kelo
Ineffective
Effective
No Reform
Ineffective
Ineffective
Effective

N/A
0
1
0
0
0
1

Source: Ilya Somin, “The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo”, pg. 14-15; Castle
Coalition, www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf , synopsis

The only discrepancies apparent in the two classification systems are three states, Idaho,
Iowa, and South Carolina. Even though Utah’s legislation is pre-Kelo, it is included in
both tests coded as “1”. The Castle Coalition awards the state of Idaho with a D+ grade
because the state’s definition of “public use” is very weak. House Bill 555 leaves room
for broad interpretation of public use and fails to prohibit strategic maneuvering of parties
interested in economic development takings. Somin classifies Idaho’s post-Kelo reform
as effective, bolstering his opinion by stating Idaho’s law “couples a ban on economic
development condemnations with restrictions on the definition of blight, roughly
speaking, restrict blight condemnations to areas that fit the intuitive layperson’s definition
of the term.”23
The Castle Coalition confers the state of Iowa a B- grade, explaining how the
significant improvement from the existing eminent domain law further protects the rights
of individual property owners. House File 2351 ensures a fair assessment of each piece
of property within the potential acquisition, requiring 75% of the individual tracts be
blighted for an entire purchase. Somin asserts, Iowa’s statute still allows prospective
23

Ilya Somin, “The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo”, pg. 35
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economic developers to evade restrictions and continue participating in takings. Somin
explains the extensive definition of blight in HF 2351 depends on “the definition of such
terms as “deterioration” and “excessive and uncorrected deterioration of site”.”24 He
classifies Iowa’s reform as ineffective. The divergence in opinions between the Castle
Coalition and Somin comes down to the interpretation of the definition of blight.
The last departure of judgment rests in the decision over South Carolina’s postKelo legislation. The Castle Coalition grants South Carolina with a grade of B+, stating
the “constitutional amendment declares that blighted property must be a danger to public
health and safety, effectively eliminating bogus blight.” Ilya Somin classifies South
Carolina as promoting ineffective legislature after the Kelo decision. South Carolina was
1 of 10 states passing reform by means of popular referendum. Even though the realized
outcome was initiated by popular referendum, the result was not sufficient for an
effective classification according to Somin. He argues, “the new constitutional
amendment adds nothing to the case law and leaves open the possibility that future court
decisions will be able to reverse it in the absence of a clear textual statement in the state
constitution to the contrary.”25
Figure 2.1 shows the state classification system created by the Castle Coalition
and Ilya Somin. The states with a dark grey background are considered to have passed
effective legislation and states with a white background are classified as ineffective. The
states with light grey shaded areas are the differences in the two classification methods
employed in this study.
24
25

Ilya Somin, “The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo”, pg. 26
Ilya Somin, “The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo”, pg. 39-40
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Figure 2.1: State Classification Allocation

Although both ordering techniques deviate away from each other on three occasions, the
majority of the classifications are consistent. Both the Castle Coalition and Somin’s
Somin
systems offer substantial evidence supporting their claims for each state’s post-Kelo
post
reform
THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE PROPE
PROPETY:
Property, public or private is formally defined as any “article, item, or thing
owned with the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment, and which the owner can
bestow, collateralize, encumber, mortgage, sell, or transfer, and can exclude everyone
else from it.”26 From the earliest known civilizations, private property is characterized by
few contractual agreements and limited use of specific boundaries. The transition from a
nomadic lifestyle to settlement dwelling, created by agriculture, led to the development of
private property. The sense of ownership and the potential profit generated by land
possession founded the initial phenomenon of property rights in the United States.
States

26

BusinessDictionary.com, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/property.html
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The essential principle at the axis of modern law explains how “property is the
guardian of every other right”27 According to Richard Epstein28, “Our founding fathers
had a keen appreciation of the central role of private property in social life, which is why
they included the takings clause in the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.”29 The suppression of the Fifth Amendment and the apathy demonstrated
by the United States Supreme Court during the New Deal era, allowed unrestricted
government access to property needed to accomplish economic development and foster
increased social welfare. The relevant neglect is present in the outcome of the Berman
and Midkiff cases. Not until the Kelo case in 2005, has the public been fully aware of the
danger imposed by the power of eminent domain and economic development takings.
“TAKINGS” AND THE STATE:
Epstein’s book, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain30,
explores nearly every facet of the policing power exhibited by the state in relationship to
eminent domain and government takings. At the outset, Epstein establishes the
importance of efficient government control by using the following pie charts.

27

Richard A. Epstein, Supreme Neglect, pg. 1
Richard A. Epstein, James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago
29
Richard A. Epstein, Supreme Neglect, pg. 2
30
Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1985
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Figure 2.2: Ineffective/Effective State Control
Ineffective State Control:

Effective State Control
a'
b'

a
f

f'
b

c'
c
d

d'

e
e'

The ineffective state control chart refers to an area where government intervention is at a
minimum. Individual property owners, a thru f, have diminishing incentives to maximize
their potential earnings by fully utilizing their endowment. If private property rights are
not well established and reinforced by a strong central government, owners are hesitant to
make necessary investments due to others threatening to take advantage of their hard
work. In a political system with explicit and enforceable property rights, society can reap
gains represented by the effective state control chart. The effective state control chart
displays the external band surrounding the initial distribution of land with ineffective
state control. Each property owner gains an additional amount of surplus a’ thru f’ from
efficient government intervention. The government entity’s primary purpose is to ensure
society moves from the small pie chart to the chart including the external net benefit to
society.
Epstein points out two present inefficiencies in the system of private property
rights, “inability to control private aggression… and voluntary transactions cannot
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generate the centralized power needed to combat private aggression.”31 The
government’s answer to the existing failures, eminent domain use, mitigates free-rider
issues, transaction costs, and holdouts by sellers. Epstein asserts government intervention
is only necessary when confronted by “problems of aggression and provision of public
goods.”32 Although the state may address market failure problems, it should be
constrained by the function it provides.
The fundamental need for civil governance and the powers obtained by political
entities results from the citizens presided over in society. Without the interaction of
individuals and the self-interested forces provoking takings, the need for protection of
property rights would be non-existent. Epstein declares, “Representative government
begins with the premise that the state’s rights against its citizens are no greater than the
sum of the rights of the individuals whom it benefits in any given transaction.”33 The
government’s sole objective is to exploit all possible gains for society. The authority of
eminent domain should only be utilized when a citizen’s utility could be increased in
comparison to their value before the transfer of property. The price received for the
relinquishing of private property should meet or exceed the opportunity cost of giving up
the possession. The takings clause in the Fifth Amendment states, “… nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
The emotions and physiological attachment accompanying ownership of a domain
significantly contributes to the intangible value appraised by the title-holder. The true

31

Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1985, pg. 5
Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1985, pg. 5
33
Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1985, pg. 331
32
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value placed on the entitlement of a tract of land and dwelling residing within,
completely exceeds the deemed worth assessed by a third party. The divergence in actual
value observed by two evaluators prompts a controversial question, “How can any
individual property owner be truly compensated for being displaced from a place they
call home?”
According to Epstein, the most optimal compensation would “leave the individual
owner in a position of indifference between the taking by the government and retention of
the property.”34 Another approach to “just compensation” is allow the market to
determine a price through bargaining between the seller and the buyer. The relevant
failure with this system lies at the foundation of modern game theory. Presume the seller
places a value of β on their property and the buyer is willing to purchase the property for
α. This is a game of asymmetric information where the valuation of both opposing sides
is unknown. If the buyer is willing to accept the seller’s offer, β, then the seller is
hesitant to sell because he has incentive to holdout for a higher payoff. The outcome
resulting in this game is inefficient due to the non-agreement realized. Overall the central
theme regarding compensation for takings is extremely convoluted and fragile.
PUBLIC USE:
The judicial result of the Berman and Midkiff cases expanded the public use term
within the eminent domain clause to include any taking for public purpose or general
social advancement.

Based on the precedent established before Kelo, Bruce Ackerman

pronounces “any state purpose otherwise constitutional should qualify as sufficiently

34

Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1985, pg. 182
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‘public’ to justify a taking.”35 When evaluating the public use doctrine, Epstein asks the
question, “Who gets the surplus?” For example36, let’s say there are 25 people in the
society and 1 central presiding body. If the government seizes a citizens’ private
property for building a community center and realizes an increase in gross surplus of
1000 utils, who receives the surplus and how is it distributed? Firstly, the citizen whose
land was acquired needs to be justly compensated (200 utils). Then, the cost of
procurement and operation of the state needs to be satisfied (300 utils). The net surplus
received by the society is 500 utils. In order for the state to remain in good standing and
act for the benefit of society, the residual utility should be allocated by imposing
symmetry. Each person in society should receive on average 20 utils of the remaining
surplus for their contribution to the state. Now let’s assume the transfer of private
property by use of eminent domain goes to a real estate developer, such as the NLDC.
Holding all other constraints ceteris paribus, how does the allocation of surplus differ
from the initial scenario? Well, the gross surplus of 1000 utils will directly go to the real
estate developer. After the former owner of property is compensated, the net surplus of
600 utils is enjoyed by the private development corporation.
The previous example enlightens the astounding disparity between the definitions
of public use and public purpose. A true public use definition is consistent with the
situation where surplus is shared by society. Interpreting public use as public purpose
allows for transfers of private property within the community to private firms with

35
36

Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (1977)
The example is a variation of one of Richard Epstein’s illustrations in Takings
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intentions of profit maximization. The wealth gain realized through a private-to-private
transaction is not enjoyed by citizens of the society.
GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES:
The relevant question at hand is why does the state not regulate against private-toprivate transfers of property, knowing the detrimental public effects ensued? The
incentives of the government are not aligned with the total wellbeing of its citizens if the
distribution of additional surplus is not properly allocated. The objective function of the
state is to provide adequate protection of its citizen’s rights and operate solely for the
purpose of optimizing the welfare of society. Government revenue is generated by means
of fiscal policy and payment from citizens for illegal infractions. The income earned by
these two forms should be for the purpose of maintaining the sustainability of the state.
Any returns exceeding necessary costs should be redistributed evenly among the
contributing citizens. What factors encourage government entities to operate like a
corporation and strive to maximize profit regardless of the cost?
The answer to the previous question is quite obvious; it all comes down to money,
population density, and power. A significant government deficit could be a potential
reason for the takings of private property by eminent domain. A state confronted with
expenses surpassing the capital inflow is inclined to operate in a dishonest manner to
maintain political power. Population density also brings up the issue of holdout. Holdout
is more likely when the number of people per acre increases. The state would be inclined
to abuse eminent domain when population patterns are quite dense. It is not a surprise
that the state of New York has not passed any reform post-Kelo. Power in the wrong
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political hands can present a serious problem to the welfare of the state. Corruption
within governing bodies is always an influencing factor for unconstitutional acts, when
the potential for capital gain is relevant. Private monetary kickbacks from real estate
developers and corporations also entice political officials to engage in unjust takings.
The governing body of the city of New London supported the takings in the Fort
Trumbull area by explaining how much public benefit would rise due to an increase in
the tax base. The proposed economic development plan supplanting the former resident
homes would produce a quite substantial amount of tax revenue for the city of New
London. The intentions of the city are not consistent with the theory representing a
government’s responsibility to its citizens. New London did not have legitimate grounds
to displace non-blighted residential homes and businesses with more fashionable
structures to augment their financial status. The cost incurred by the dwellers of Fort
Trumbull exceeded the public gain garnered from the eminent domain acquisition. The
ruling may be deemed a public purpose by the U.S. Supreme Court, but it does not
qualify as a public use. The surplus present after the seizure should be reallocated among
the citizens, in order to make everyone at least as well off as before the event. This is not
the case in the result decided in Kelo v. City of New London. The existing surplus is
attained by the city and the private development corporation
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION:
The sample examined in this study comes from a population of bonds included in
the Bloomberg Professional financial database. Specifically, the sample is described as
bonds issued by municipalities for the purpose of economic improvement, public
improvement, and industrial improvement. The constraints imposed on the population to
derive the sample are as follows:
Bloomberg Search Criteria:
1. The bond has to be issued by a municipality within the United States including
Alaska and Hawaii
2. The municipal bond has to be offered for the function of generating capital for
economic improvement, public improvement, and industrial improvement
3. The issue date of the municipal bond has to fall in the range of 06/28/1984 –
01/01/2005
4. The maturity date of the municipal bond has to fall in the range of 08/01/2008 –
01/01/2027
5. The selected municipal bonds are not bounded by coupon payment limits (0 - ∞)
Table 3.1 illustrates the summary statistics regarding the selected municipal bonds and
the classification allocation.
Table 3.1: Sample Description
Variables
Number of Muni’s
Number of Muni’s (Economic
Impt.)
Number of Muni’s (Industrial Impt.)
Number of Muni’s (Public Impt.)
Issue Date
Maturity Date
Dummy Variable (Somin) = 0
Dummy Variable (Somin) = 1

Mean Std. Dev. Skewness
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

Count
4403
3064
922
417
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

3244
1159

n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
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Range
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
06/28/1984 01/01/2005
08/01/2008 01/01/2027
n/a
n/a

Dummy Variable (CC) = 0
Dummy Variable (CC) = 1

3210
1193

n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a

Source: Bloomberg Professional

Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of types of municipal bonds (economic improvement,
industrial improvement, and public improvement). The percentage of economic
improvement municipal bonds significantly outweighs the other two types. The sample
will be evaluated in the aggregate and by type.
Figure 3.1: Municipal Bond Allocation

Figure 3.1: Municipal Bond Allocation

21%

Number of Economic
Improvement Munis
Number of Public
Improvement Munis

9%
70%

Number of Industrial
Improvement Munis

The sample includes 42 of the 50 states. Of the 42 states, the allocation of the
number of municipal bonds in each one is depicted in Figure 3.2. The top 5 states with
the most observations in the sample are California, Illinois, Mississippi, Texas, and
Georgia. The states with the fewest observations are Alaska, Montana, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, and Tennessee. The 8 states that are not included in this analysis are
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n/a
n/a

Hawaii, Idaho, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming, New Mexico, and New
Hampshire.
Figure 3.2: Frequency Distribution

Figure 3.2: Frequency Distribution
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The sample data obtained from Bloomberg Professional is time series municipal
bond yields starting on 1/7/2005 and continuing weekly until 7/11/2008. The yields are
always reported on Fridays. The current yields correspond to each municipal bond
selected in the sample. Statistics also gathered for each municipal bond CUSIP include,
coupon payment rates, issue date, maturity date, state code, municipal purpose, and
municipal region. In addition to the data collected on municipal bonds, a dummy
variable will be defined for the effectiveness of post-Kelo legislation corresponding to
each state.
The entire sample will be divided into a treatment group and a control group. The
treatment group will consist of any municipal bond issued in a state categorized as
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passing effective post-Kelo legislation. The control group will consist of any municipal
bond issued in a state classified as passing ineffective post-Kelo legislation.
MUNICPAL BOND PURPOSES:
This section expands on the reasons why municipal bonds are issued and what
activities qualify as economic, industrial, and public improvements. According to the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), “municipal bonds are issued by states,
counties, cities or their agencies to finance public-purpose projects … schools, roads,
bridges, utilities, affordable housing, airports, hospitals, and other public facilities and
programs.”37 In order to generate money for financing development activity, bonds are
often issued by municipalities. The three types of municipal bonds analyzed in this paper
are believed to have the highest correlation with funding efforts for eminent domain
takings.
Nearly all economic improvement bonds in the sample are issued for the purpose
of funding redevelopment plans. The redevelopment plans include projects such as
updating dilapidated neighborhoods, modernizing downtown areas, and renewing
merchant areas. Table 3.2 shows a few examples of municipal bonds from different
states offered with the intentions of economic improvement.

Table 3.2: Economic Improvement Municipal Bonds
CUSIP:
34711GBH

State:
Colorado

20772F6Y
07201TXB
551541AP

Connecticut
California
Florida

37

Purpose:
Police service building and deicing
storage facility
General capital to the state of CT
Funding Redevelopment Agencies
Lynn Haven Industrial Park

Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, http://emma.msrb.org/EducationCenter/WhatAreBonds.aspx
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199112CU

Georgia

Assorted Reason. See reference in
paragraph below

The municipal bond issued by the city of Fort Collins, Colorado is for the purpose
of building a police service building and a deicing storage facility. The municipal bond’s
official statement says, “The net proceeds of the certificates are to be used by the
corporation to acquire from the city fee or leasehold interests in the site, to acquire,
construct, and install the improvement on two parcels of the site…”38 This specific
municipal bond offering may be used to build a public building, but the surplus is
experienced by a corporation. The municipal bond offered by California is for the
purpose of funding redevelopment agencies, such as the Claremont Redevelopment
Agency and the Redevelopment Agency of the City of Lakeport. The corresponding
official statement to the California CUSIP 07201TXB states:
“All power of a redevelopment agency is vested in the members of its Board of
Directors, which often is the City Council of the city in which the redevelopment
agency was formed. The redevelopment agency exercises governmental function
in carrying out projects and has sufficiently broad authority to acquire, develop,
administer and sell or lease property, including the right of eminent domain and
the right to issue bonds or incur other types of indebtedness and to expend the
proceeds. A redevelopment agency can demolish buildings and other
improvements and can own or acquire real property and develop the same.”39

38
39

Official Statement, CUSIP: 34711GBH, http://emma.msrb.org/MS198370-1.pdf
Official Statement, CUSIP 07201TXB, http://emma.msrb.org/MS204070-1.pdf, pg. 4.
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California is the heaviest user of eminent domain takings and most frequent state exposed
in the municipal bond sample. California is guilty of transferring eminent domain
authority to private firms in order to carry out economic development takings.
The municipal bond (551541AP) offered by Florida is for the redeveloping a city
owned parcel of land to provide a 100,000 square foot manufacturing facility in Lynn
Haven Commerce Park.40 The municipal bond issued by Georgia is for an assorted
number of reasons including, refunding and redeeming a portion of the outstanding
Columbus Building Authority Revenue Bonds, cost of acquiring land and or acquiring,
installing, and developing certain facilities to be used for government, proprietary, and
administrative functions, capitalized interest, and the cost of issuance of new revenue
bonds.41
Municipal bonds issued for the purpose of industrial improvement include
projects such as purchasing office space, environmental activist movements, industrial
training, and school renovations. Table 3.3 shows a few examples of municipal bonds
from different states offered with the intentions of industrial improvement.
Table 3.3: Industrial Improvement Municipal Bonds
CUSIP:
130609AV

State:

394631AC
010608XV

North
Carolina
Alabama

455261UV

Indiana

California

40

Purpose:
Acquisition of administrative offices
and Clean Air Act
Redevelopment of land for International
Paper
Training for Hyundai and Mercedes
manufacturing42
Park Tudor School renovation43

Official Statement, CUSIP 551541AP, http://emma.msrb.org/MS93763-1.pdf, pg. 6.
Official Statement, CUSIP 199112CU, http://emma.msrb.org/MS132070-1.pdf, pg. 7.
42
Official Statement, CUSIP 010608XV, http://emma.msrb.org/MS176569-1.pdf, pg. 4.
43
Official Statement, CUSIP 455261UV, http://emma.msrb.org/MS133950-1.pdf, pg. 3.

41
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The municipal bond issued by California is for the purpose of acquiring a building in
Sacramento to house administrative offices for the District and provide funding for a
Clean Air Act.44 North Carolina issued CUSIP 394631AC to fund a redevelopment
project to replace an old processing plant owned by the city with a new facility operated
by International Paper.45 The transfer of property would generate more tax revenue for
Green County, North Carolina. The use of eminent domain is limited in the majority of
the selected industrial improvement municipal bonds.
Municipal bonds issued for the purpose of public improvement include
projects such as redevelopment plans, zoos, water treatment plants, sanitation, etc. Table
3.4 shows a few examples of municipal bonds from different states offered with the
intentions of public improvement.
Table 3.4: Public Improvement Municipal Bonds
CUSIP:
797300UZ
059189BF
877223MC
68607VJU

State:

California
Maryland
Michigan
Oregon

Purpose:
Horton Plaza Redevelopment46
Assortment of Public Improvements47
Land Acquisitions48
Schools and State Fair49

The use of funding generated by the issuance of California’s CUSIP 797300UZ was to
provide liquidity in the Horton Plaza redevelopment plan. The capital was used to
support the private agency’s development needs, including acquisition of property,

44

Official Statement, CUSIP 130609AV, http://emma.msrb.org/MS164666-1.pdf, pg. 4.
Official Statement, CUSIP 394631AC, http://emma.msrb.org/MS171616-1.pdf, pg. 6.
46
Official Statement, CUSIP 797300UZ, http://emma.msrb.org/MS148676-1.pdf, pg. 6.
47
Official Statement, CUSIP 059189BF, http://emma.msrb.org/MS144443-1.pdf, pg. 9-10.
48
Official Statement, CUSIP 877223MC, http://emma.msrb.org/MS163479-1.pdf, pg. 4.
49
Official Statement, CUSIP 68607VJU, http://emma.msrb.org/MS182936-1.pdf, pg. 11.

45
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demolishing of older buildings, and refinancing land. Maryland’s municipal bond
offering included redevelopment projects such as zoos, schools, libraries, office
buildings, and sanitation. Eminent domain takings are not present in the official
statements for public improvement bond offerings except for California.
California is a regular user of establishing agencies to carry out economic
development takings. The power of authority is given to different agencies depending on
the specific economic development objective the city has in mind. The money needed to
acquire the necessary property is obtained by offering municipal bonds. California uses
economic, industrial, and public improvement bonds to find financing for their projects.
STATISTICAL MODELING:
The basic objective of the model is to describe the result of effective legislation
on current bid yields of municipal bonds pertaining to economic improvement, industrial
improvement, and public improvement. In order to create an efficient method to capture
the predicted outcome, a strategic model is constructed. Through a difference-indifference test, municipal bond yields will be evaluated on several combinations of two
static dates. The first date (January 7, 2005) will be before the Kelo case was heard in the
United States Supreme Court. The second observed date will be several randomly
selected dates after the Kelo decision until July 2008. The analysis is suspended at this
limit due to the financial crisis in the markets beginning the summer of 2008, caused by
the subprime mortgage meltdown. The difference-in-difference test at two distinct points
in time controls for outside factors such as Federal Reserve monetary activity, inflation
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adjustments, and international currents. This practice ensures all tested municipal bonds
have equivalent exposure to exogenous forces.
The endogenous variable explored in the treatment is the difference between the
municipal bond yield after the decision at one of the selected months and the
predetermined date before the Kelo hearing. The derivation of the dependent variable is
as follows.
Equation 1: ∆Yi = yi1 − yi 0
The term yi1 is each individual municipal bond’s yield at a selected date after the Kelo
decision. The term yi0 is each individual municipal bond’s yield at the fixed date before
the initial Kelo hearing.
One independent variable employed in the regression is a binary treatment
variable specifying “1” for states with effective post-Kelo legislation and “0” for states
with ineffective post-Kelo legislation. Each individual CUSIP will be coded with a “0”
or “1” depending on which type of legislation state the bond was issued. The dummy
variable representing reform effectiveness will take on two classification systems. The
study will be estimated using the Castle Coalition’s classification method and Ilya
Somin’s categorization procedure.
The Kelo dummy variable will be coded “0” starting on 01/07/2005 and continue
for each date until the final decision was expressed on 06/23/2005. Every date after the
case was closed will receive a “1”. The Kelo dummy variable intends to explain the
financial effect experienced because of the Kelo decision.
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The selected statistical model uses regression analysis to impose the dummy
variable for legislature effectiveness, and the dummy variable representing the Kelo
decision, on the difference variable. The Ordinary Least Squares regression model
exhibits the following functional form when applied to the present scenario:
Equation2: ∆Yi jt muni = β 0 + β1 * DVi code + β 2 * DV kelo + U i
The β0 coefficient determines the intercept term when all of the explanatory variables are
coded “0”.

Parameter estimation explains the impact of the coefficient, β1 on the change

in municipal bond yields over two specified dates. The β1 term is known as the
difference-in-difference estimator. It can be manually calculated by taking the average
yields of each classification of legislature strength at the two dates. Equation 2 shows the
computation method predicting the difference and difference coefficient.
Equation 3: β1 = (Yield1After − Yield 0After ) − (Yield1Before − Yield0Before ) 
The term Yield1After shows the average yields of all municipal bonds issued by a state with
effective post-Kelo reform on a selected date after the Kelo decision. The expression
Yield 0After explains the mean yields of all municipal bonds issued by a state with

ineffective post-Kelo reform on a selected date after the Kelo decision. The term
Yield1Before shows the average yields of all municipal bonds issued by a state with effective

post-Kelo reform on the chosen date, 01/07/2005. The expression Yield 0Before shows the
average yields of all municipal bonds issued by a state with ineffective post-Kelo reform
on the chosen date, 01/07/2005.
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The β2 coefficient shows the effect of the date Kelo was decided on the stream of
municipal bond yields. If the coefficient is positive, the dummy variable corresponding
to the Kelo decision contributes the observed difference in municipal bond yields. If the
β2 term is negative, the Kelo dummy takes away from divergence in municipal bond
yields. The Ui term explains the error in the model not captured by the exogenous
variables.
The data will be initially tested using the entire sample of municipal bond yields.
A difference-in-difference analysis for the complete sample will be evaluated annually in
the month of July after the Kelo decision. After the preliminary study, subsets of the
sample will be observed to determine how much impact one category has on the
aggregate outcome. The municipal bonds will be separated based on the purpose of the
issue. The procedure will generate three subsets in the sample, economic improvement,
industrial improvement, and public improvement. Equation 4, 5, and 6 will estimate each
of the subsets respectively, economic improvement, industrial improvement, and public
improvement.
Equation 4: ∆Yijtecon = β 0 + β1 * DVi code + β 2 * DV kelo + U i
Equation 5: ∆Yijtindus = β 0 + β1 * DVi code + β 2 * DV kelo + U i
Equation 6: ∆Yijtpublic = β 0 + β1 * DVi code + β 2 * DV kelo + U i
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HYPOTHEIS DECLARTION:
The difference-in-difference estimator is the coefficient of interest in the research
inquiry. The study is attempting to provide insight on the financial effect on municipal
bond yields caused by post-Kelo reform. I aim to show how substantial restrictions on the
grasping hand of economic development takings permitted by eminent domain will lead
to a significant change in municipal bond yields. The formal hypothesis tested in the
analysis is as follows:
Test 1:

HO: β1 = 0
HA: β1 > 0

The municipal bond yields for states that passed effective post-Kelo reform are expected
to rise between the measurement dates because of the high cost involved in the
acquisition of private property. The increased protection of property rights will drive the
price of the bond down and inversely cause the yield to go up. The municipal bond
yields for states that passed ineffective post-Kelo reform are projected to fall because the
difficulty to seize property is very low. The minimal cost to acquire land under
ineffective reform inflates the price of the bond causing the yield to decrease. A onesided test will be used to explain the difference in the β1 coefficient because the predicted
result will be positive. The null hypothesis states, there is no variation in municipal bond
yields due to the type of state legislation passed after the Kelo decision. If the null
hypothesis is supported, the strength of reform passed has no explanation power of the
fluctuations of municipal bond yields. The alternate hypothesis provides the contrary to
the null hypothesis. If the alternate hypothesis is accepted, effective post-Kelo reform
actually has a considerable influence on the observed changes in municipal bond yields.
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This outcome would be the consequence of strong legislation restricting the use of
eminent domain to acquire private property for private use.
The second hypothesis test includes the β2 coefficient representing the financial
impact induced by the Kelo decision. The formal hypothesis test for Kelo dummy
variable is as follows:
Test 2:

HO: β2 = 0
HA: β2 < 0

The null hypothesis describes the condition where the Kelo outcome has no influence on
municipal bond yields. The alternate hypothesis explains the scenario where the Kelo
result decreases the municipal bond yield. If the analysis rejects the null hypothesis in
favor of the alternate, the predicted result is confirmed. Since the Kelo decision does not
offer any further restrictions on municipalities performing eminent domain takings, the
yields should decrease. The price of the bond will rise because private property is easier
to take and inversely the yield will diminish. The predicted effect will be a negative sign
on the β2 coefficient.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS
ENTIRE SAMPLE ANALYSIS:
The summary statistics describing the differences on each observed date is offered
in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variables:
Mean:
0.0003
Diff. 07/01/2005
0.1928
Diff. 07/07/2006
0.1798
Diff. 07/06/2007
0.1443
Diff. 07/04/2008

Std. Dev.:

Skewness:

0.071
0.113
0.151
0.181

Range:

-0.844
2.228
3.702
5.114

(-0.423) – (0.416)
(-0.140) –( 1.332)
(-0.332) –( 2.052)
(-0.353) –( 2.707)

Source: Bloomberg Professional

The results obtained by following the preceding methodology are presented using the
Castle Coalition’s classification method and Somin’s classification system for the entire
sample. Figure 4.1 graphically depicts the total sample by displaying the yield before on
the y-axis and the yield after on the x-axis.
Figure 4.1: Before and After Comparison
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The yields of states that failed to pass legislation after the Kelo decision do not deviate
away from an imaginary 45 degree line. The yields of states that passed ineffective
legislature tend to show a slight divergence of before and after yields. As predicted, the
yields of effective states are apt to be higher after substantial reform has been enacted
than before the legislation.
The STATA results will start at the first month prior to the Kelo decision and
report annually until the last accounted date of the sample, July 4, 2008. Appendix A and
B show the statistical output for the Castle Coalition’s classification system and Somin’s
classification system respectively, derived by regressing the dummy variable for
legislature effectiveness, and the dummy variable representing the Kelo decision on the
independent variable. Each coefficient in the analysis is listed in table 4.2 below and the
standard error is in parenthesis.
Table 4.2: Entire Sample Regression Output
Difference Variable:
07/01/2005: CC
07/01/2005: Somin
07/07/2006: CC
07/07/2006: Somin
07/06/2007: CC
07/06/2007: Somin
07/04/2008: CC
07/04/2008: Somin

β1: Diff-in-Diff
0.016
(0.002)
0.015
(0.002)
0.012
(0.003)
0.010
(0.003)
0.021
(0.005)
0.019
(0.005)
0.025
(0.006)
0.024
(0.006)
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Β2: DV_Kelo
-0.047
(0.015)
-0.047
(0.015)
-0.058
(0.024)
-0.057
(0.024)
-0.089
(0.033)
-0.088
(0.033)
-0.120
(0.039)
-0.119
(0.039)

Regardless the classification system applied to the model and at all relevant points
in time, the difference-in-difference estimator is significant at the 99% confidence
interval. The coefficients range from a maximum of 0.025 to a minimum of 0.012. The
difference-in-difference estimator explains how much of the observed difference in
municipal bond yields at two points is accounted for by effective state legislature.
According to the findings, effective post-Kelo reform contributes up to a 0.025
percentage points in the total variation over time. The adjustment due to legislation with
strength may seem small, but when describing yields on municipal bonds, a 0.025
percentage change is economically meaningful.
The dummy variable representing the time at which the Kelo decision was
confirmed shows a negative coefficient. The Kelo binary variable shows the effect of the
high court’s decision on municipal bond yields. According to the results, the Kelo
decision is consistent with the predicted results, that Kelo should decrease the yields.
This occurrence is due to the confirmation of weak property right protection by the
Supreme Court. The court’s decision allows municipalities to acquire land at a low
marginal cost which inflates the bond’s price.
The entire model built on the explanatory variables; dummy variable for
legislature effectiveness and the dummy variable representing the Kelo decision only
capture a minor portion of the total difference in municipal bond yields. This occurrence
is reflected in relatively low adjusted R-squared. The error term Ui retains most of the
residual significance not described by the model. Even though a low adjusted R-squared
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is present, the objective of the analysis, discover the effects of effective post-Kelo reform,
was accomplished.
ANALYSIS OF SAMPLE SUBSETS:
An investigation of three subsets within the sample will be tested to determine if
any one factor is responsible for driving the results in the entire model. The three subsets
examined pertain to the purpose or reason why the municipality issued the bond. The
divisions are economic improvement, industrial improvement, and public improvement.
Appendix C shows the results of the regression analysis for municipal bonds offered for
the purpose of economic improvement. Appendix D shows the results of the regression
analysis for municipal bonds offered for the purpose of industrial improvement.
Appendix E shows the results of the regression analysis for municipal bonds offered for
the purpose of public improvement. Table 4.3 shows the regression coefficients for each
subset. Each coefficient in the analysis is listed below and the standard error is in
parenthesis.
Table 4.3: Subset Regression Output
Difference Variable:
07/07/2006: CC: Econ Imprv.
07/07/2006: Somin: Econ Imprv.
07/04/2008: CC: Econ Imprv.
07/04/2008: Somin: Econ Imprv.
07/07/2006: CC: Ind Imprv.
07/07/2006: Somin: Ind Imprv.
07/04/2008: CC: Ind Imprv.
07/04/2008: Somin: Ind Imprv.

β1: Diff-in-Diff
0.026
(0.004)
0.025
(0.004)
0.041
(0.005)
0.041
(0.005)
-0.036
(0.106)
-0.036
(0.010)
-0.033
(0.020)
-0.033
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Β2: DV_Kelo
-0.068
(0.021)
-0.068
(0.021)
-0.142
(0.028)
-0.142
(0.028)
0.110
(0.034)
0.110
(0.034)
0.126
(0.066)
0.126

07/07/2006: CC: Pub Imprv.
07/07/2006: Somin: Pub Imprv.
07/04/2008: CC: Pub Imprv.
07/04/2008: Somin: Pub Imprv.

(0.020)
0.000
(0.009)
-0.006
(0.010)
-0.031
(0.012)
-0.044
(0.012)

(0.066)
-0.006
(0.021)
-0.003
(0.021)
-0.003
(0.028)
0.000
(0.027)

The estimation of all three subsets enlightens the driving force behind the
coefficient of interest. The difference-in-difference estimator for municipal bonds issued
for the purpose of economic improvement explains more than 0.04 percentage points of
the change in yields over the time series. The coefficient standing for state legislature
effectiveness for economic improvement inundates the state legislature effectiveness
coefficients regarding industrial and public improvements.
The dummy variable representing the time at which the Kelo outcome became
public information displays results almost consistent with the entire sample. Municipal
bonds offered for the purpose of economic improvement displays negative coefficients.
The coefficients for industrial improvements and public improvements are positive, but
they are insignificant.
HYPOTHESIS RULING:
Based on the analysis, the null hypothesis for test 1, there is no variation in
municipal bond yields due to the type of state legislation passed after the Kelo decision,
is rejected at a 0.01 level of significance. The alternate hypothesis, there is a positive
change in municipal bond yields due to the strength of state legislation passed after Kelo,
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is confirmed by the results in the study. States that passed effective statutes post-Kelo
actually make a difference in the yields realized by investors of municipal bonds. Strong
restrictions against eminent domain takings make it harder for municipalities to take
private property, which decreases the price of a municipal bond. Inversely a decrease in
the price of a municipal bond will lead to increase in the yield.
Hypothesis test 2 offers results that confirm the predicted outcome of the impact
of the Kelo decision on municipal bond yields. The negative coefficient on β2 provides
insight on the increased incentive of municipalities to perform takings because the
Supreme Court was not willing to set a meaningful restriction. The less cost involved in
the takings process, the more willing municipalities are to perform takings, and the higher
the price of municipal bonds.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
DISCUSSION
Epstein brings up the question, “What minimum of additional power must be
added for the state to become more than a voluntary protective association and to acquire
the exclusive use of force with its territory?”50 His concise answer summarizes all
literature dealing with eminent domain and government intervention with one response,
“the only additional power needed is the state’s right to force exchanges of property
rights that leave individuals with rights more valuable than those they have been deprive
of.”51 He goes on to express the limitations of eminent domain that are necessary for the
state to be in compliance with its regulatory duties to its citizens. The state may utilize
eminent domain for only the reason of public use, negating any private-to-private
transfers. Also each citizens affected by eminent domain takings must receive an
efficient outcome through just compensation.
The U.S. Supreme Court has deviated away from the intended meaning of the
takings clause in the Fifth Amendment. By neglecting to enforce restrictions on the
power of the state, the legal system has failed to protect individual’s private property
rights. The federal judicial deference to the state’s reasoning ability is a complete failure
to the entire property rights system. Allowing states to determine the necessary
allocation of property will almost always result in inefficient outcomes. Kelo is a prime
example of eminent domain abuse by the state and it demonstrates an inefficient
allocation of rights. The city of New London completely disregarded every constitutional
50
51

Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1985, pg. 332
Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1985, pg. 332
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constraint on the state and initiated a redevelopment plan promoting a one-sided gain.
The true cost was placed on the displaced residents of Fort Trumbull and the “public
benefit” was redistributed among developers, corporations, and government entities.
This outcome is not consistent with the actual purpose of the state. The explanation is
bolstered by the negative coefficient of β2 found in the study. The Kelo result offered by
the high court provides no additional protection of private property rights. The case gives
municipalities more incentive to transfer private property for private gain because the
Supreme Court makes it easier to get away with takings.
Effective state legislation induced by Kelo has been a hopeful step in the right
direction for the protection of individual’s property rights. Ineffective state reform
containing loopholes such as broad definitions of blight and limited areas still eligible for
takings has not contributed any meaningful reassurance to the problem at hand. Only
legislation with strength against unjust takings deserves merit.
The purpose of the study was to supplement the existing literature pertaining to
eminent domain by using a novel approach. Yields on municipal bonds issued for the
reasons of economic improvement, industrial improvement, and public improvement
were analyzed to expand on the consequences of effective vs. ineffective post-Kelo
reform. The research inquiry started with an investigation of the reasons why a state
would be inclined to seize a citizen’s private property and transfer the rights of ownership
to another private party. The gain realized by the breach of duties by the state would
have to exceed the loss incurred from public distrust. New London was faced with the
moral decision, to maintain social equilibrium and continue to protect the rights of its
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taxpaying citizens or deviate away from its obligation and pursue selfish endeavors at the
cost of its citizens. The potential gains, in the form of tax revenue to the state from the
transfer of wealth, surpassed the state’s social commitment to be an advocate of
individual’s property rights.
After establishing government motives to act unconstitutionally, a further
examination about funding ensued. In order to pay fair market value or “just
compensation” to each person forced to surrender their rights, capital has to be generated.
Municipalities issue bonds with a specific purpose in mind to create liquidity. The
capital raised by debt instruments is used to justly compensate individuals for
relinquishing their property for economic development. Municipal bonds offered by
financially stable cities are presumed to be sound investments with the potential for solid
growth and low probability of default. Municipal bonds offered by financially unsteady
cities possess the characteristics of being risky investments and having questionable
growth estimates. A bond issued by a municipality within a state that diligently protects
the property rights of its citizen, should have a higher return over the term compared to a
bond offered by a municipality within a state that fails to pass effective eminent domain
legislation. In order to entice prospective investors, weak legislation states offer high
coupon payments to offset the low returns. The average coupon payment for ineffective
eminent domain legislation states is 4.76 and the average coupon payment for states
passing effective post-Kelo reform is 4.67.
Kelo left its unpleasant impression on the legal system as well as every property
owner throughout the United States. The analysis of municipal bond yields in the study
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offers further insight on the consequences Kelo prompted. The results discovered in the
model supports the importance of valuable eminent domain legislation. Effective state
legislation explains up to 0.02 percentage points of the difference in municipal bond
yields observed after Kelo. States enacting strong post-Kelo reform are commended for
their efforts to maintain social order, promote equality among citizens, and fulfill the
obligations of the state. These states should serve as models of social efficiency and
judicial reverence for states continuing to practice unconstitutionally.
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Appendix A
Castle Coalition Classification:
07/01/2005:
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.264 305888
22.4 085834

2
4400

.132152944
.00509286

Total

22.6 728893

4402

.005150588

diff07012005

Coef.

dv_class_CC
dv_kelo
_cons

.0 16098
-.0 47754
.04 28571

Std. Err.

t

.0024 22
.01562 42
.0155 73

6.65
-3.06
2.75

Number of obs
F(
2,
4400)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0.000
0.002
0.006

=
=
=
=
=
=

4403
2 5.95
0. 0000
0. 0117
0. 0112
.0 7136

[95% Conf. Interval]
.01 13497
-.07 83852
.01 23263

.020 8463
-.017 1228
.07 3388

07/07/2006:
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.194656031
56.2629317

2
4400

.097328015
.01278703

Total

56.4575878

4402

.01282544

diff07072006

Coef.

dv_class_CC
dv_kelo
_cons

.0123269
-.058142
.247381

Std. Err.

t

.0038377
.0247571
.024676

3.21
-2.35
10.03

Number of obs
F(
2,
4400)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0.001
0.019
0.000

=
=
=
=
=
=

4403
7.61
0.0005
0.0034
0.0030
.11308

[95% Conf. Interval]
.004803
-.1066785
.1990035

.0198507
-.0096056
.2957584

07/06/2007:
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.563868473
100.294263

2
4400

.281934236
.022794151

Total

100.858132

4402

.022911888

diff07062007

Coef.

dv_class_CC
dv_kelo
_cons

.0219451
-.0894842
.2629524

Std. Err.

t

.0051239
.0330543
.032946

4.28
-2.71
7.98

Number of obs
F(
2,
4400)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0.000
0.007
0.000

=
=
=
=
=
=

4403
12.37
0.0000
0.0056
0.0051
.15098

[95% Conf. Interval]
.0118997
-.1542872
.1983617

.0319905
-.0246812
.327543

07/04/2008:
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.8 45 60 77 35
14 4. 57 44 34

2
4 40 0

. 42 28 03 86 8
. 03 28 57 82 6

Total

14 5. 42 00 41

4 40 2

. 03 30 34 99 4

diff07042008

Coef.

dv_class_CC
dv_kelo
_cons

. 02 57 67 6
-. 12 04 95 8
. 25 73 33 3

Std. Err.
. 00 61 51 9
. 03 96 85 8
. 03 95 55 8

t
4. 19
- 3. 04
6. 51
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Number of obs
F(
2,
4400)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0. 00 0
0. 00 2
0. 00 0

=
=
=
=
=
=

4 40 3
12 .8 7
0 .0 00 0
0 .0 05 8
0 .0 05 4
. 18 12 7

[95% Conf. Interval]
.0 13 70 68
- .1 98 29 99
.1 79 78 41

.03 78 28 4
- .04 26 91 6
.33 48 82 5

Appendix B
Somin Classification:
07/01/2005:
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.238447406
22.4344419

2
4400

.1 1 9 2 2 3 7 0 3
.0 0 5 0 9 8 7 3 7

Total

22.6728893

4402

.0 0 5 1 5 0 5 8 8

diff07012005

Coef.

dv_class_S
dv_kelo
_cons

.015284
-.0474138
.0428571

Std. Err.
. 0 0 2 4 4 57
. 0 1 5 6 3 26
. 0 1 5 5 8 19

t
6.25
-3.03
2.75

Number of obs
F(
2,
4400)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0.000
0.002
0.006

=
=
=
=
=
=

44 0 3
2 3. 3 8
0 . 00 0 0
0 . 01 0 5
0 . 01 0 1
. 0 71 4 1

[95% Conf. Interval]
. 0 1 0 4 8 93
- . 0 7 8 0 6 16
. 0 1 2 3 0 87

. 0 2 0 07 8 7
- . 0 1 67 6 6
. 0 7 3 40 5 6

07/07/2006:
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.1 6 3 2 8 68 5 9
56 . 2 9 4 30 0 9

2
44 0 0

. 08 1 6 4 3 42 9
. 01 2 7 9 4 15 9

Total

56 . 4 5 7 58 7 8

44 0 2

.0 1 2 8 2 54 4

diff07072006

Coef.

dv_class_S
dv_kelo
_cons

. 0 1 0 86 1
-. 0 5 7 6 58 6
. 2 4 7 38 1

Std. Err.
. 0 0 3 87 4 1
. 0 2 4 76 3 2
. 0 2 4 68 2 9

t
2. 8 0
- 2. 3 3
1 0. 0 2

Number of obs
F(
2,
4400)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0 . 00 5
0 . 02 0
0 . 00 0

=
=
=
=
=
=

44 0 3
6. 3 8
0 . 00 1 7
0 . 00 2 9
0 . 00 2 4
. 1 13 1 1

[95% Conf. Interval]
. 00 3 2 6 5 8
- . 10 6 2 0 6 9
. 1 98 9 9

. 0 1 8 45 6 1
- . 0 0 9 11 0 3
. 2 9 5 77 1 9

07/06/2007:
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.4 8 20 6 23 2 1
10 0 .3 7 60 6 9

2
44 0 0

.2 4 10 3 11 6
. 02 2 81 2 74 3

Total

10 0 .8 5 81 3 2

44 0 2

. 02 2 91 1 88 8

diff07062007

Coef.

dv_class_S
dv_kelo
_cons

. 0 19 8 62 5
-. 0 88 7 63 1
. 2 62 9 52 4

Std. Err.
.0 0 5 17 3 1
.0 3 3 06 6 6
.0 3 2 95 9 4

t
3. 8 4
- 2. 6 8
7. 9 8

Number of obs
F(
2,
4400)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0 . 00 0
0 . 00 7
0 . 00 0

=
=
=
=
=
=

44 0 3
1 0. 5 7
0 . 00 0 0
0 . 00 4 8
0 . 00 4 3
. 1 51 0 4

[95% Conf. Interval]
. 00 9 72 0 6
- . 15 3 59 0 3
. 19 8 33 5 4

. 03 0 00 4 4
- .0 2 39 3 6
. 32 7 56 9 4

07/04/2008:
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.78 49 279 9
1 44. 63 511 3

2
44 00

. 392 46 399 5
. 032 87 161 7

Total

1 45. 42 004 1

44 02

. 033 03 499 4

diff07042008

Coef.

dv_class_S
dv_kelo
_cons

.02 45 979
- .11 99 865
.25 73 333

Std. Err.
.0 06 209 8
.0 39 692 7
.0 39 564 1

t
3. 96
-3. 02
6. 50

52

Number of obs
F(
2,
4400)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0. 000
0. 003
0. 000

=
=
=
=
=
=

44 03
11. 94
0 .00 00
0 .00 54
0 .00 49
. 181 31

[95% Conf. Interval]
.01 24 236
- .19 78 042
.17 97 679

. 03 677 22
-. 04 216 87
. 33 489 88

Appendix C
Economic Improvement:
Castle Coalition : 07/07/2006
SS

Source

df

MS

Model
Residual

. 4561 7363 2
2 8.51 5890 3

2
3061

.2 2808 681 6
.0 0931 587 4

Total

2 8.97 2063 9

3063

.0 0945 872 1

diff07072006

Coef.

dv_class_CC
dv_kelo
_cons

.026 5389
- .068 6618
.24 7381

Std. Err.

t

.004 1872
.021 1557
.021 0621

6. 34
-3. 25
11. 75

Number of obs
F(
2,
3061)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0.0 00
0.0 01
0.0 00

=
=
=
=
=
=

306 4
24.4 8
0 .000 0
0 .015 7
0 .015 1
. 0965 2

[95% Conf. Interval]
.018 3289
- .110 1427
.206 0836

.03 4748 8
- .02 7180 9
.28 8678 3

Somin : 07/07/2006
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

. 4307 2971 2
2 8.54 1334 2

2
3061

.2 1536 485 6
.0 0932 418 6

Total

2 8.97 2063 9

3063

.0 0945 872 1

diff07072006

Coef.

dv_class_S
dv_kelo
_cons

.025 9493
- .068 3243
.24 7381

Std. Err.

t

.004 2428
.021 1642
.021 0715

6. 12
-3. 23
11. 74

Number of obs
F(
2,
3061)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0.0 00
0.0 01
0.0 00

=
=
=
=
=
=

306 4
23.1 0
0 .000 0
0 .014 9
0 .014 2
. 0965 6

[95% Conf. Interval]
.017 6304
- .109 8218
.206 0652

.03 4268 3
- .02 6826 7
.28 8696 7

Castle Coalition : 07/04/2008
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

1. 2 9 5 71 6 8 6
51 . 6 7 39 8 4 6

2
3 0 61

.6 4 7 85 8 4 3
. 01 6 8 81 4 0 6

Total

52 . 9 6 97 0 1 5

3 0 63

. 01 7 2 93 4 0 6

diff07042008

Coef.

dv_class_CC
dv_kelo
_cons

. 0 4 1 72 3 8
-. 1 4 2 72 6 2
. 2 5 7 33 3 3

Std. Err.
. 0 05 6 3 6 6
. 0 28 4 7 8 7
. 0 28 3 5 2 7

t
7.40
-5.01
9.08

Number of obs
F(
2,
3061)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0. 0 0 0
0. 0 0 0
0. 0 0 0

=
=
=
=
=
=

3 0 64
3 8 . 38
0. 0 0 00
0. 0 2 45
0. 0 2 38
.1 2 9 93

[95% Conf. Interval]
. 0 3 06 7 2
- .1 9 8 56 5 6
. 2 0 17 4 1

. 0 52 7 7 56
- . 0 86 8 8 68
. 3 12 9 2 56

Somin : 07/04/2008
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

1. 2 7 5 12 4 4 3
5 1 . 6 94 5 7 7

2
3 0 61

. 63 7 5 62 2 1 4
. 01 6 8 88 1 3 4

Total

52 . 9 6 97 0 1 5

3 0 63

. 01 7 2 93 4 0 6

diff07042008

Coef.

dv_class_S
dv_kelo
_cons

. 0 4 1 78 5 7
-. 1 4 2 41 0 6
. 2 5 7 33 3 3

Std. Err.
.0 0 5 7 1
. 0 28 4 8 3 1
. 0 28 3 5 8 4

t
7.32
-5.00
9.07

53

Number of obs
F(
2,
3061)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0. 0 0 0
0. 0 0 0
0. 0 0 0

=
=
=
=
=
=

3 0 64
3 7 . 75
0. 0 0 00
0. 0 2 41
0. 0 2 34
.1 2 9 95

[95% Conf. Interval]
. 0 30 5 9
- .1 9 8 25 8 6
. 2 01 7 3

. 0 52 9 8 15
- . 0 86 5 6 26
. 3 12 9 3 67

Appendix D
Industrial Improvement:
Castle Coalition: 07/07/2006
SS

Source

df

MS

Model
Residual

. 4 68 4 8 25 3
2 2 . 60 1 5 11 3

2
918

. 2 34 2 4 1 26 5
. 0 24 6 2 0 38 3

Total

2 3 . 06 9 9 93 8

920

. 02 5 0 7 60 8

dif~07072006

Coef.

dv_class_CC
dv_kelo
_cons

- . 0 36 0 0 68
. 1 10 2 8 25
. 1 16 2 8 57

Std. Err.
.0 1 0 68 6 3
.0 3 4 89 7 3
.0 3 4 24 0 3

t
- 3. 3 7
3. 1 6
3. 4 0

Number of obs
F(
2,
918)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0 .0 0 1
0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 1

=
=
=
=
=
=

92 1
9 .5 1
0 . 0 00 1
0 . 0 20 3
0 . 0 18 2
. 1 5 69 1

[95% Conf. Interval]
- .0 5 6 97 9 2
.0 4 1 79 4 7
.0 4 9 08 7 3

- . 01 5 0 34 4
. 17 8 7 70 4
. 18 3 4 84 1

Somin: 07/07/2006
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

. 47 5 9 96 1
2 2 . 59 3 9 97 7

2
918

. 23 7 9 9 80 5
. 0 24 6 1 2 19 8

Total

2 3 . 06 9 9 93 8

920

. 02 5 0 7 60 8

dif~07072006

Coef.

dv_class_S
dv_kelo
_cons

- . 0 36 5 4 04
. 11 0 3 73
. 1 16 2 8 57

Std. Err.
. 01 0 7
. 0 3 48 8 8
.0 3 4 23 4 6

t
- 3. 4 1
3. 1 6
3. 4 0

Number of obs
F(
2,
918)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0 .0 0 1
0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 1

=
=
=
=
=
=

92 1
9 .6 7
0 . 0 00 1
0 . 0 20 6
0 . 0 18 5
. 1 5 68 8

[95% Conf. Interval]
- .0 5 7 53 9 7
.0 4 1 90 3 6
.0 4 9 09 8 5

- . 01 5 5 41 1
. 17 8 8 42 4
. 18 3 4 72 9

Castle Coalition: 07/04/2008
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

. 50 54 64 92 8
8 1. 32 42 20 8

2
9 18

.2 52 732 46 4
.0 88 588 47 6

Total

8 1. 82 96 85 7

9 20

.0 88 945 31 1

dif~07042008

Coef.

dv_class_CC
dv_kelo
_cons

- .0 33 38 53
.1 26 95 33
.0 88 66 67

Std. Err.
.0 20 27 07
.0 66 19 63
.0 64 95

t
- 1. 65
1. 92
1. 37

Number of obs
F(
2,
918)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0 .1 00
0 .0 55
0 .1 73

=
=
=
=
=
=

92 1
2 .8 5
0 .0 58 2
0 .0 06 2
0 .0 04 0
. 29 76 4

[95% Conf. Interval]
- .0 73 16 76
- .0 02 96 03
-. 03 88 01

.0 06 39 7
. 25 68 66 9
. 21 61 34 3

Somin: 07/04/2008
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

. 5 05 02 33 1 3
8 1 .3 24 66 2 4

2
9 18

.2 5 25 11 6 57
.0 8 85 88 9 57

Total

8 1 .8 29 68 5 7

9 20

.0 8 89 45 3 11

dif~07042008

Coef.

dv_class_S
dv_kelo
_cons

- . 03 34 02 9
. 12 68 48 9
. 08 86 66 7

Std. Err.
. 0 20 30 01
. 0 66 18 97
. 0 64 95 01

t
- 1 .6 5
1 .9 2
1 .3 7

54

Number of obs
F(
2,
918)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0 .1 00
0 .0 56
0 .1 73

=
=
=
=
=
=

92 1
2 .8 5
0 .0 58 3
0 .0 06 2
0 .0 04 0
. 29 76 4

[95% Conf. Interval]
-. 0 73 24 3
- .0 0 30 51 7
- .0 3 88 01 3

.0 0 64 37 1
.2 5 67 49 5
.2 1 61 34 7

Appendix E
Public Improvement:
Castle Coalition: 07/07/2006
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.00 073 384 4
3.7 707 086 7

2
41 3

.0 003 669 22
.0 091 300 45

Total

3.7 714 425 2

41 5

.0 090 878 13

dif~07072006

Coef.

dv_class_CC
dv_kelo
_cons

.0 005 166
-.0 061 561
.2 175 714

Std. Err.
.0 099 46
.02 171 59
.0 208 51

t
0 .05
-0 .28
10 .43

Number of obs
F(
2,
413)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0.9 59
0.7 77
0.0 00

=
41 6
=
0.0 4
=
0. 960 6
=
0. 000 2
= -0. 004 6
=
.0 955 5

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.0 19 034 5
-.0 48 843 5
.1 76 584 1

. 020 067 8
. 036 531 3
. 258 558 7

Somin: 07/07/2006
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.004 67636 2
3.77 02495 7

2
414

.002 33818 1
.009 10688 3

Total

3.77 49259 3

416

.009 07434 1

dif~07072006

Coef.

dv_class_S
dv_kelo
_cons

-.00 66393
-.00 34499
.21 75714

Std. Err.
.0100 15
.0216 65
. 02082 45

t
-0. 66
-0. 16
10. 45

Number of obs
F(
2,
414)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0.50 8
0.87 4
0.00 0

=
417
=
0.26
=
0. 7737
=
0. 0012
= -0. 0036
=
.0 9543

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.0 2632 6
-.04 6037 1
.17 6636 4

.013 0474
.039 1374
.258 5064

Castle Coalition: 07/04/2008
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.09 747 502 6
6.3 525 425 3

2
41 3

.0 487 375 13
.0 153 814 59

Total

6.4 500 175 6

41 5

.0 155 422 11

dif~07042008

Coef.

dv_class_CC
dv_kelo
_cons

-.0 317 582
-.0 030 173
.1 794 286

Std. Err.
.01 290 96
.02 818 64
.02 706 38

t
-2 .46
-0 .11
6 .63

Number of obs
F(
2,
413)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0.0 14
0.9 15
0.0 00

=
=
=
=
=
=

41 6
3.1 7
0. 043 1
0. 015 1
0. 010 3
.1 240 2

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.0 57 134 9
-. 05 842 4
.1 26 228 6

-. 006 381 5
. 052 389 4
. 232 628 6

Somin: 07/04/2008
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.184047169
6.27375587

2
414

.092023585
.015154

Total

6.45780304

416

.015523565

dif~07042008

Coef.

dv_class_S
dv_kelo
_cons

-.0444663
.0007754
.1794286

Std. Err.
.0129191
.0279472
.026863

t
-3.4 4
0.0 3
6.6 8

55

Number of obs
F(
2,
414)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE
P>|t|
0.001
0.978
0.000

=
=
=
=
=
=

417
6.07
0.0025
0.0285
0.0238
.1231

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.06 98615
-.05 41608
.12 66238

-.0190712
.0557115
.2322334
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